The cases are charged as conspiracies under 18 U.S.C. 371, alleging bank fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. The cases are complex and document intensive. It is essential to retain a qualified federal defense attorney if contacted by law enforcement, or if there is any concern that an investigation is under way. Please contact me if you have any concerns about a possible investigation, or if you have been contacted by law enforcement. Keep in mind that many persons considered "witnesses" potentially face exposure to criminal prosecution, so retaining counsel is of utmost importance.
]]>The Proposition does three things: it overhauls the parole hearing system by undoing the right of inmates to have parole considered on a yearly basis; it requires that institutions not release inmates early due to overcrowding by directing the Legislature to ensure sufficient funding; and it creates a series of enforceable victims' rights. This article discusses the latter of the Proposition's objectives.
The Proposition lists 17 rights it designates as "personally held and enforceable" by "victims." The term "victim" is defined to include persons harmed by financial as well as violent crimes, and includes family members of direct victims. The Proposition contemplates that victims can be represented by legal counsel during all proceedings.
Among the victims' rights created are the rights: to be protected from the defendant; to have the safety of the victim considered in fixing bail; to refuse to be interviewed by a defendant's attorney; to be notified concerning court appearances, and to discuss the case with the prosecutor; to a "speedy trial and a prompt and final conclusion of the case and any related post-judgment proceedings"; and to receive a copy of the probation report.
The three most significant rights created by the Proposition are the rights to refuse to be interviewed, to participate in the legal proceedings, and to prevent disclosure of information and records to defense counsel. I will discuss these rights individually as the represent the most significant change to the justice system.
Right to Refuse Interview. The Proposition states that victims have the right "to refuse an interview, deposition, or discovery request by the defendant, the defendant's attorney, or any other person acting on behalf of the defendant, and to set reasonable conditions on the conduct of any such interview to which the victim consents."
Existing law provides that victims and witnesses have the right to refuse an interview by a defense investigator, or to set conditions for the interview. The Proposition requires that all "victims" be notified of this and other rights. Presumably a "victim advocate" associated with the prosecutor's office will also inform the victim of the right not to talk to the defense attorney or defense investigator. Simply providing this information will effectively allow the prosecutor to shut down all contact between the "victim" and defense counsel, and crime victims will take it as a suggestion that they should refuse to be interviewed. Persons claiming to be crime victims will be dissuaded from speaking with defense counsel. The victim will be able to get a court order that defense counsel not attempt to contact the victim or the victim's family. The result will be the court sanctioned dissuading of victims and witnesses from speaking with defense counsel.
There is simply no need for this right. Presently, a defense investigator must identify him or herself as a representative of the defendant when speaking with victims or other witnesses. Victims or other witnesses may not be harassed by an investigator and can refuse to speak, should they choose to do so. It would seem that the purpose of making the right enforceable by court order is to block defense counsel from contacting victims and witnesses. Interviewing all witnesses, including victims should they be willing to meet with an investigator, is essential to effective legal representation. Important information is obtained by having an investigator interview a so called "victim" as often the police interviews fail to address relevant facts and biases. This right will protect the lying or exaggerating crime "victim" from legitimate questioning.
]]>On Wednesday (10/15/08) the court will hear argument in Waddington v. Sarausac (07-772), and Hedgpeth v. Pulido (07-544). Both cases address federal habeas review of state jury instructional issues. Waddington involves whether federal courts on habeas review must accept state court determinations that jury instructions correctly explain state law regarding accomplice liability. The issue in Hedgpeth is whether federal courts on habeas review may determine erroneous jury instructions on which the jury may have relied to constitute structural error requiring reversal.
]]>Luong’s case was originally brought in the state court. After the state court suppressed the evidence, Luong was indicted in federal court. Luong’s motion to suppress was granted by the District Court, the court finding that the affidavit was so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it was not objectively reasonable for an officer to rely on the warrant.
On appeal, the government conceded that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. However, the government maintained that suppression was unnecessary under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), due to the officers’ good faith reliance upon the warrant. The court stressed that the Leon good faith test was an objective one, the inquiry being “whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.” The court discussed the situations in which reliance on a warrant cannot be considered objectively reasonable. One of those situations is when the affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that official belief in its existence is objectively unreasonable. The court concluded that the Luong affidavit was so deficient that the officer’s reliance thereon was unreasonable. Totally missing from the affidavit was any factual basis to believe the anonymous tip was true. “The tip must include a ‘range of details,’ and it must predict future actions by the suspect that are subsequently corroborated by the police.” United States v. Morales, 252 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2001).
The court rejected the government’s claim that exigent circumstances made it objectively reasonable for the officers to rely on the warrant. Also rejected was an attempt to justify reliance on the affidavit by facts orally conveyed to the magistrate but not contained in the affidavit. The court stressed that “all data necessary to show probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be contained within the four corners of a written affidavit given under oath.” United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1067 (9th Cir.2006).
In Zavala, application of the sentencing guidelines yielded a life sentence “range.” During the sentencing hearing, the district court characterized the guideline sentence as the “presumptive sentence.” Defense counsel argued that the starting point of analysis was the statutory minimum sentence. The court explained its view of post-Booker sentencing, stating, “I think it is clear . . . that we start with the Guideline range and then work from that to determine whether there are facts in this case unique to this case which justify the Court in disregarding the Guideline range, or at least deviating from the Guideline range in some fashion.” The court considered the relevant sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), ultimately concluding that the appropriate sentence was 30-years’ imprisonment rather than imprisonment for life.
The court in Zavala concluded that “[i]f a district court presumed that the sentence should be a Guideline range sentence, it would thereby make it much more than something to be consulted and would give it much heavier weight than section 3553(a) now does. That leaves it as a factor in the sentencing alchemy.” The court stated that “a presumption at the district court would give undue weight to the Guidelines. The dangers averted by declaring them to be merely advisory would become recrudescent.”
After Zavala it is clearly error for the district court to apply greater significance to the guidelines. The court stated, “[i]f a district court does show a kind of resistence and, instead, makes the Guideline calculation the presumptive sentence, it will commit legal error by misapplying section 3553(a), which now makes the Guideline a, but only a, factor to be considered.” The foregoing passage is important language in the Zavala opinion. Appellate counsel should consider whether a district court, by virtue of the language it uses or its sentencing practice, has shown “resistence” to the principle announced in Zavala.
The Zavala opinion is notable not only for its holding, but for its entertaining use of language. In one passage, the court writes that “Booker has resuscitated the much-lamented discretion that the sentencing statute seemed to take away from district courts, and has at least partially restored that halcyon condition that district judges have longed for these many years. District courts neither should, nor can, ignore that by placing undue weight on the Guideline portion of the sentencing chemistry.”
Zavala is a good read. Its rich passages should be quoted in every sentencing memorandum filed in the district court.
My first thought is that it will be unusual for circumstances analogous to those in Georgia v. Randolph to occurr. How often is the co-occupant present when the police arrive? The dissent is concerned about the impact upon victims of domestic violence. Putting asside the issue of whether Roberts and Scalia are not being true to their conservative judicial philosophy by permitting their fourth amendment analysis to be bent by concerns over a popular, albiet important, social issue, the dissent just has no idea how domestic violence cases are investigated. When a purported domestic abuse victim calls 911 reporting that the alleged abuser is in the house, responding officers know what to do to ensure their entry into the home is justified by the "exigent circumstance" of preventing further domestic abuse or by preserving evidence of domestic abuse. In practice, it is fairly easy for officers responding to a domestic violence call to either obtain the needed consent, or to adequatly justify their entry into the home. Right or wrong, the courts seem very willing to listen to an officer's justification for the entry.
]]>Held: To subject defendant to the mandatory registration requirement of section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A) would deny defendant the equal protection of the laws because there is no similar registration requirement for statutory rape. The Court of Appeal was directed to remand the case to the trial court, however, to exercise its discretion to determine whether the defendant should be required to register as a sex offender under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E). (People v. Hofsheier (2006) __ Cal.4th __ (S124636/H026217).) This case was decided on 3/6/06.
I would anticipate legislation to require sex offender reigstration for unlawful sex with a minor. (Pen. Code, section 261.5.) Such change would render Hofsheier void.
]]>Needless to say, those seeking change to the "three strikes" law should contact their representatives.
Readers should also visit the Families to Amend California's Three Strikes ("FACTS") website (here). Donations to this effort will be important is it will surely be opposed by the California Correctional Peace Officer's Association ("CCPOA"). If only the Governor could break away from the grip of the CCPOA on this . . . .
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