Law Office of Tim Warriner

March 19, 2006

Case of the Month: People v. Hofsheier

Does Penal Code section 290 violate the equal protection clause of the state or federal Constitution by requiring a defendant convicted of oral copulation with a minor to register as a sex offender but not requiring such regsitration by a defendant convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor?

Held: To subject defendant to the mandatory registration requirement of section 290, subdivision (a)(1)(A) would deny defendant the equal protection of the laws because there is no similar registration requirement for statutory rape. The Court of Appeal was directed to remand the case to the trial court, however, to exercise its discretion to determine whether the defendant should be required to register as a sex offender under section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(E). (People v. Hofsheier (2006) __ Cal.4th __ (S124636/H026217).) This case was decided on 3/6/06.

I would anticipate legislation to require sex offender reigstration for unlawful sex with a minor. (Pen. Code, section 261.5.) Such change would render Hofsheier void.

Posted by Tim Warriner at 09:21 AM

January 08, 2006

Case of the Month: Batson post Miller-El & Johnson-- Williams v. Runnels

In Williams v. Runnels (9th Cir. Jan. 5, 2006), the appellant argued that during his state trial for second-degree robbery, he made a prima facie showing of discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky when he objected to the prosecutor's use of three of four peremptory challenges to excuse African-Americans. During appellant's trial, when the court indicated that counsel could make peremptory challenges, the prosecutor stated that he would accept the jury. Defense counsel excused jurors, and in response, the prosecutor exercised four peremptory challenges. Only four of the first forty-nine potential jurors were African-American. A Wheeler objection was made after the fourth challenge. The trial judge ruled that a prima facie case of racial discrimination had not been shown and refused to put on the record the prosecutor's justifications for the challenges. The Ninth Circuit found that the proseucutor's challenges presented a prima facie Batson violation.

The court in Williams applied Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 2410 (2005) and Miller-El v. Dretke, 125 S. Ct. 2317 (2005). It cited a passage in Johnson stating that the Supreme Court "did not intend the first step to be so onerous that a defendant would have to persuade the judge--on the basis of all the facts, some of which are impossible for the defendant to know with certainty--that the challenge was more likely than not the product of purposeful discrimination." The court noted that a defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson's first step "by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." Johnson, supra, at 2417.

The court's use of the term "statistical disparity" when referring to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges against three out of four African-American jurors, and the fact that only four of the potential jurors were African-American, is interesting. Trial counsel must make extra effort to keep track of the numbers of prospective minority jurors, as well as how many are struck by the prosecution. Williams stands for the proposition that a "statistical disparity" ought to get you past the first step of the Batson analysis.

The court in Williams was critical of the method by which the district court and California Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction. The court noted that all the prior reviewing courts did was review the evidence in the record concerning the challenged jurors and determine that the record contained evidence for each juror that would support peremptory challenges on non-objectionable grounds. "This, however, does not measure up to the Supreme Court's pronouncement that the question is not whether the prosecutor might have had good reasons, but what were the prosecutor's real reasons for the challenges. Johnson, 125 S. Ct. at 2418; see also Miller-El, 125 S. Ct. at 2332 ("A Batson Challenge does not call for a mere exercise in thinking up any rational basis.")." (Emphasis added.)

Johnson and Miller-El have breathed new life into Batson claims. Williams is one example of the reach of these decisions.

Posted by Tim Warriner at 03:21 PM

November 22, 2005

Case of the Month: The 9th Circuit Unchained! US v. Howard

In United States v. Howard (Nov. 15, 2005), the 9th Circuit prohibited the practice of the Central District of California of shackling all defendants during arraignment in front of a magistrate judge. The court held the district-wide policy "effects a diminution of the liberty of pretrial detainees and distracts from the dignity and the decorum of a critical stage of a criminal prosecution." However, the court suggested that a properly justified policy of shackling may be upheld with "adequate justification of its necessity."

The court does an interesting analysis of shackling cases. While the typical concern in these cases is the prejudice that inheres when a defendant is shackled in front of the jury, Howard discusses the other concerns implicated when a defendant is shackled. The court cited Supreme Court precedent describing shackling as an "affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold." The court expressed concern that shackling interfered with communication between attorney and client, embarassed defendants, thereby impairing "mental faculties," and may cause a defendant physical and emotional pain.

The court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that if a restriction is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal "a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 (1979). The Howard court concluded that "a pretrial detainee has a substantive due process right against restrictions that amount to punishment."

The court was unable to uphond the shackling policy on the record before it. While it invited the Central District to adopt a policy that adequately justified shackling, it seemed to caution that fiscal or budgetary concerns will not justify the polcy, noting that "the Supreme Court has already held that financial concerns should not be a justification for cutting back on the constitutional rights of criminal defendants."

Shackling is a hot area of law right now. Trial counsel must be sure to adequately preserve objections to shackling for appellate review.

Posted by Tim Warriner at 07:03 PM